Volume 53
Issue 4 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 53,
1948-1949
6-1-1949

Recent Cases

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra

Recommended Citation
Recent Cases, 53 DICK. L. REV. 333 (1949).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol53/iss4/17

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POLICE POWER-SOUTH CAROLINA
STATUTE REGULATING FUNERAL INSURANCE: A South Carolina Statutet
provides ( 1) that life insurance companies and their agents may not own or operate an undertaking business and (2) funeral directors or their employees may not
be licensed as insurance agents. Criminal sanctions are provided.
Plaintiff, Family Security Life Insurance Company, was writing a "pre-paid
funeral" type of insurance. The officers of the company. were funeral directors
and the officers and employees of mortuaries in the state were solicited as stockholders and agents.
All policies and operations of the plaintiff had been approved by the South
Carolina Insurance Commissioner, and claims were paid in cash. Beneficiaries were
permitted (1) freedom of choice in the selection of a funeral home and (2) the
selection of the type and cost of merchandise and services.
The plaintiff brought suit to enjoin the enforcement of the statute. A permanent injunction was granted in the District Court. The South Carolina AttorneyGeneral appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Held: the statute is not
so arbitrary, discriminative, or unrelated to elimination of genuine evil as to deny
due process of law.
That.the states under the police power have a general power to regulate all
kinds of business by legislation for the purpose of protecting the public health,
morals, safety, or general welfare is now commonly recognized and accepted. 2
In the regulation of businesses under the police power the state legislatures and
the courts have experienced considerable difficulty. There has been a continual
conflict between the sovereignty of the police power of the state and the protection of the fundamental rights of the citizens under the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment s of the Federal Constitution.
5
Inthe instant case both insurance 4 companies and undertaking establishments
are deemed to be of a public or quasi-public nature, which the legislature may

I Act No. 787, S. C. Acts of 1948, 45 Stat. at large, p. 1947.
2 Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311, 27 Sup Ct. 289, 51 L. ed. 499 (1907) ; Noble State Bank
v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 31 Sup. Ct. 186, 55 L. ed. 112 (1911); Chicago, Burlington and
Quincy Ry. Co. v. Drainage Commission of Illinois, 200 U.S. 561, 26 Sup. Cf. 391 (1906).
8 Article 14 (section 1). "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein
they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person oj life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."
4 German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 54 Sup. Ct. 612 (1913).
5 Prata Undertaking Co. v. State Board of Embalming and Funeral Directing, 55 R.I. 454,
182 A. 808, 104 A.L.R. 389 (1936).
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regulate and control to safeguard the public health, safety, morals, and general
welfare. However, as stated in Liggett Company v.Baldridge:C
..a state may not, under the guise of protecting the public, arbitrarily
interfere with' private business or prohibit lawful occupations or impose
unreasonable and unnecessary restrictions upon them."
Upon this case plaintiff, life insurance company, relied. The Supreme Court,
in the Liggett case held it unconstitutional for a state statute to require every drug
store to be owned by licensed pharmacists. 7 Holmes and Brandeis in their dissenting opinion said: "The Constitution does not make it a condition of preventive
legislation that it should work a perfect cure. It is enough if the questioned act
has a manifest tendency to cure or at least to make the evil less." Thus it would
seem that during the last twenty years here has been a decided swing in viewpoint
from the majority view of Liggett Company v. Baldridge to that expressed in the
dissent of Holmes and Brandeis.
That there is a presumption of constitutionality s and a tendency to uphold
state statutes today seems to be further emphasized when the Supreme Court in
the Family Security Life Insurance case said:
"There is a pronounced shift of emphasis since the Liggett case that has
deprived the words 'unreasonable' and 'arbitrary' of the content for which
respondents (insurance company) contend."
The recent case of Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron and
Metal Company,9 allowing legislative protection for non-union workers, did not
permit the due process clause to interfere with a state statute. The Court said:
"They are returning closer and closer to the earlier constitutional
prindple that states have power to legislate against what are found to be
injurious practices in their internal commercial and business affairs, so
long as their laws do not run afoul of some specific federal constitutional
prohibition, or of some valid federal law." (Italics supplied)'
The Nebbia10 case is perhaps the origin of this change in principle. In this
case the Court upheld the Milk Control Board's order setting the prices distributors and storekeepers were permitted to charge per quart of milk. That the
state could determine rates of public utilities was not questioned, as public utilities
were said to be "affected with a public interest." However, this limitation on the
states' control was eliminated when the Court interpreted the phrase to mean
no more than: "that an industry, for adequate reason is subject to control for
6 278 U.S. 105, 49 Sup. Ct. 59, 73 L.Ed. 204 (1928); accord; Burns Baking Co. v.
Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 44 Sup. Ct. 412, 32 A.L.R. 661 (1923).
7 Accord: George B. Evans v. Baldridge, 294 Pa. 142, 144 A. 97 (1928).
8 Dufour v. Maize, 358 Pa. 309, 56 A. 2d 675 (1948).
9 Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron and Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 69 Sup.
Ct. 251, 1074 (1949).
10 Nebbia v. People of State of New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940,
89 ALP., 1469 (1933),
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the public good." Thus the ruling of the milk commission was neither arbitrary
nor unreasonable in view of the economic conditions that existed during the depression of the 1930's.
Following the Nebbia case the Supreme Court in West Coast Hotel Company
v. Parrish et ux" upheld the State of Washington's minimum wage law requiring
payment to women of wages which are found necessary for decent maintenance
of women. Again, due to economic conditions and a tendency to support the
state legislature, the statute was found to be neither arbitrary nor capricious.
Then in Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron and Metal Compony12 the Court said:
'Under this constitutional doctrine the due process clause is no longer
to be so broadly construed that the Congress and state legislatures are put
in a strait jacket when they attempt to suppress business and industrial
conditions which they regard as offensive to public welfare."
Therefore, in view of the trend since the Nebbia case, a more lenient policy
to uphold state statutes regulating private business seems to exist. Heretofore
the statutes that have been upheld have dealt with prices and wages. However, in
the instant case it becomes clear that the policy of permitting states to regulate
the businesses within the state will not be confined to mere regulation of prices
or wages. In the Liggett case mere ownership of a pharmacy could not be regulated by the state, However, in the Family Security Life Insurance Company case
ownership of a mortuary or a life insurance company can be regulated regardless
of the fact that at present there exists in the state sufficient legislative control
of each business for the protection of the public.
The holding of the Supreme Court is, however, no surprise in view of the
strong language expressed in the Lincoln Federal Labor Union case and the obvious trend since the Nebbia case.
OTHO WILLIAM VANDERLIN

11 West Cost Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 57 Sup. Ct. 578, 81 L. d. 703. 108
A.L.R. 1330 (1936).

12 Supra.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MASTER AND SERVANT: The refusal, by
an employer, to allow a labor organizer to use employer-owned property for the
purpose of union organization is an unfair labor practice.1 A recent decision handed down by the Supreme Court in National Labor Relations Board v. Stowe Spinning Co. 2 has extended this principle so as to make this an unfair labor practice
even though the property, the use of which has been denied, is entirely disconnected from the employer's business enterprise. This would seem to be a further
encroachment by labor upon the property rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.3
The practice complained of in Republic Aviation Corp. v. National Labor
Relations Board and National Labor Relations Board v. Le Tourneau Co. of
Georgia4 was the discharge of employees engaged in union solicitation upon the
company's parking lot. The lot was adjacent to the plant; it was used by the
workers; it Was owned and policed by the employer; and was in general connected
with the employer's business enterprise. The Supreme Court sustained the Board's
finding that this was an unfair labor practice and violative of the Wagner Act.
The Board relied upon this holding.
In the case under discussion, i. e., National Labor Relations Board v. Stowe
Spinning Co., supra, the employer refused permission to a union organizer to
use, for the purpose of union activity, an employer-owned meeting hall in the
center of a company-owned town. The hall was located above the post-office.
It was used by a fraternal organization of townspeople, including employees of
the defendant and others. It was erected on the understanding that only this
fraternal organization might use it, but it did not appear that this had been strictly
enforced prior to this labor activity. Thus it can be seen that the property in
question was not used in connection with the business enterprise; it was not
located near the employer's mills; and it was not used exclusively by employees.
The board's finding that the refusal "to permit use of the hall.. under the
circumstances constituted unlawful disparity of the treatment and discrimination
against the union," was reversed by the Court of Appeals, and went to the Supreme
Court on certiorari.
The Board contended that the case fell within the doctrine of the Repulblic
Avaition Corp and Le Tourneau case, supra,. The employer argued that the doctrine of that case was limited to property connected with the business enterprise
and that to extend it to other property would violate the Fifth Amendment.
The court recognized the extension of the doctrine but held that it did not violate
the Fifth Amendment. The court further stated that it was not every interfer1 324 U. S. 793, 65 S. Ct. 982, 157 ALR 1081 (1945).
2 69 S. Ct. 541 (1949).
3 Nor shall any person "'bedeprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
4 See footnote 1.
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ence with property rights that was prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. 6 Quoting
from the Republic and Le Tourneau case, the court said: "Inconvenience, or even
some dislocation of property rights, may be necessary in order to safeguard the
rights of collective bargaining."
In a well written dissent, Justice Reed expressed the problem unequivocally
and in a negative manner pointed out the effects and the consequences of the
majority ruling. He said: 6
"There is a distinct line of cleavage as to the rights of employees
between facilities and means of production open to the use of employees through their employment contract and other property of the
employer that may be used by any person other than the owner only
through some contract, license, or permission, not a part of the employment contract."
and added:
"The employer is not required to aid employees to organize. The
law forbids only interference. . .Employment in a business enterprise
gives an employee no rights in the employer's other property disconnected from that enterprise."
In apparent realization of the possibilities of this advance however, the
court did modify the Board's order so as to restrain the employer merely from
any activity which would cause a union's application for the use of the hall to
be treated on any different basis than those of others similarly situated.
VIRGIL F. MORACA
6 324 U. S. 793 at 802.

6 69 S. Ct. 541 at 548.
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EVIDENCE-WITNESSES--CRIMINAL LAW: Attention is directed to
the recent case of Michelson v. United States, 69 S. Ct. 213, 1948, wherein the
Supreme Court of the United States seized upon the opportunity there presented
to discuss the practice of the admission and exclusion of character evidence in
criminal cases. The majority opinion by Mr. Justice Jackson and the dissenting
opinion by Mr. Justice Rutledge cover all the various phases of the introduction
of such evidence during a criminal prosecution. The Court discussed the inadmissibility of character evidence by the prosecution in the first instance; the .admissibility of such evidence by the defendant; and the cross-examination of the
defendant's character witnesses by the prosecution after the defendant has put
his reputation in issue. It is in connection with this last point (the cross-examination of the defendant's witnesses by the prosecution after defendant has put his
reputation in issue) that this particular case proves interesting and causes the
division in the Court.
The facts of the case in this regard are as follows: Defendant is on trial
for bribery of a federal revenue agent. Defendant's counsel, on direct examination,
brought out that the defendant was convicted of a misdemeanor (trading in counterfeit watch dials) twenty years before. On cross-examination of the defendant's
character witnesses, the prosecution was allowed to ask whether they had heard
of defendant's arrest for receiving stolen goods some twenty-seven years before.
This was allowed because the defendant put his reputation in issue and opened
the door to such inquiry. The defendant objects to this cross-examination and
upon conviction appeals.
In the Circuit Court of Appeals the conviction of the lower court was sustained but the court, in its opinion, thought that the dissimilarity between the two
offenses (bribery and receiving stolen goods) was too great to allow the inquiry
and thought the rule should be changed.
The Supreme Court in sustaining the conviction said that the evidence of the
prior crime of twenty-seven years before was admitted merely to test the knowledge
of the witnesses as to the reputation of the defendant and was not admitted for
the purpose of showing prior offenses to the prejudice of the defendant. Since
the witnesses had stated that they had known defendant for thirty years and defendant himself had admitted a prior offense twenty years before, it was merely
to test the knowledge of reputation. The Court admitted that an event of
twenty-seven years before might have little to do with the reputation of the defendant today, but added that coupled with the admission of the other offense
and the limiting instructions given by the trial court, they could not hold it to
be an abuse of discretion. They stated that the law on the admissibility of such
evidence had grown up over the years and even though many anomalous rules
may spring therefrom, the method fits the needs in the long run. The Court
seemed to feel that in the main the state courts are presented with the problem
and it is their province to make any needed changes. They did not feel that any
change they could promulgate would have the needed effect.
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In the dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Rutledge followed the theory that
the cross-examination of the witnesses should be limited to a rebuttal of contradictory witnesses and questioning as to general reputation, but that is as far as
it should extend. He disagrees with the majority when they say that once the
defendant has opened the door by putting his reputation in issue, the prosecution
can meet the issue by cross-examination of the witnesses and that the defendant
can't complain of the latitude given the prosecution in such cross-examination
because the defendant voluntarily put such question in issue.
In the concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated that his feelings
run with the dissent, but did not join because he felt it would accomplish nothing
and prove unprofitable. He said that the discretion should be left with the trial
judge, when the problem arises.
The conclusion drawn from the case seems to be that the admission or exclusion of such character evidence is in the discretion of the trial court and if
such discretion is not abused in the opinion of the appellate court, then such
rulings will not be overruled. We see this from part of the opinion (P. 223) of
the Court:
"We concur in the general opinion of courts, textwriters, and the
profession, that much of this is archaic, paradoxical and full of compromises and compensations by which an irrational advantage to one
side is offset by a poorly reasoned counterprivilege to the other. But
somehow it has proved a workable even if clumsy system when moderated
by discretionary controls in the hands of a wise and strong trial court."
However this may be, it seems that a mere arrest of twenty-seven years
prior to the pesent trial of the defendant would have little to do concerning
the witnesses' knowledge of the reputation of the defendant. Even though the
trial judge determined privately from the prosecution that the arrest had actually
taken place, it seems that it would serve no other purpose than to show a prior
offense of the defendant. The jury would certainly have difficulty in separating
this testimony from the defendant himself, and there can be no telling the amount
of prejudice caused thereby. The prosecution seems to be doing indirectly what
they can't do directly in that when the reputation of the defendant is put in
issue, they can attack it only by showing prior convictions and not merely arrests.
The distinction between allowing the admission of evidence of prior offenses of
the defendant (both convictions and arrests) to test the witnesses' knowledge
of the reputation of the defendant in order to attack their credibility and allowing
the admission of evidence of prior convictions to attack the credibility of the defendant, as here drawn, seems rather fine.
There is evidently need of some type of change in the common law rules
concerning this type of evidence, when inquiry can be made into the past of a
defendant as was done in this case. The Court did note however, that the problem
is being met in many of the states by statute.
JOHN MCCAMLEY
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PUBLIC SCHOOL AUTHORITY: With the
increase in building costs, repair expenses and general overhead due to post war
conditions, many Pennsylvania school districts found themselves in dire need of
economic assistance. Being cognizant of the seriousness of the problem the Pennsylvania Legislature on July 5, 1947, created the Public School Building Authority.'
The declared purpose of this Authority is the construction, improvement and
operation of school buildings throughout the state. The accomplishment of these
purposes is to be attained by the use of long term leases, not to exceed thirty
years, by which a school district acquires the right of use during the lease period.
The financing of construction is to be accomplished by the sale of bonds to the
general public by the Authority.
Shortly after its creation the Authority's constitutionality was put in issue
in the case of Greenhalgh v. Woolworth, et al.a On March 21, 1949, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rendered its decision on the problem.
The case arose when the Authority prepared to enter into a contract to lease
a public school building to the West Mifflin Borough School District. The plaintiff, a taxpayer of the District, claimed the statute creating the Authority was unconstitutional. On "case stated" the Supreme Court answered four questions as to
the constitutionality of the Act.
1. It was first contended that the Authority was circumventing the Pennsylvania Constitution by acquiring capital assets whose cost exceeded the two per
centum constitutional debt limitation.3 The court in reply pointed out that the
leases will be "straight leases" in that at the end of the specified period the
title and ownership remains in the Authority. Therefore the agreement merely
gave the District a lease and not an asset. Furthermore the right of a school
district to lease is granted by statute.4 It can therefore be seen that the contract to lease did not increase the capital assets.
2. The second objection was that part of the current receipts which would
be needed to pay its obligations under the lease come from state appropriations
received by the District. In answering this contention the court relied on Article
X, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution which provides that the State shall
maintain a thorough and efficient system of public schools. 5 In compliance with
this constitutional declaration the legislature provided for state assistance in the
School Code of 1911.6 In reliance on the case of Wilson v. PhiladelphiaSchool
I

State Public School Building Authority Act of July 5, 1947, P. L. 1217, 24 PS 791.1.

2 -Pa.-,

64 A. 2d 659 (1949).

8 Pennsylvania Constitution 1874. Article IX, § 8.
4 Act of May 18, 1911, Section 602 P. L. 309, 24 PS 672; and the General State Authority Act of June 28, 1935, P. L. 452, as amended by the Act of September 8, 1938, P. L. 23,
71 PS 1707-9.2.
5 Pennsylvania Constitution 1874, Article X, § 1.
6 Act of May 18, 1911, P. L. 309 § 1, 24 PS as amended 24 PS 1216.1 and 1216.2.
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Disirict7 the court stated that it is not unjustifiable to assume that the School District will continue to receive an annual state appropriation and it is not improper
to enter such money in the current receipts.
3. It was also believed that the Act was unconstitutional because the obligations assumed under the lease increased the debt limitation beyond its constitutional bounds. This argument was founded on the theory that the project is
not self-liquidating since the School District can make no charge for the use
of the school and must pay all its obligations from its current receipts.
A self-liquidating project, as defined by Chief Justice Kephart in Kelly v,.
Earle," is "one wherein the revenues received are sufficient to pay the bonded
debt and interest charge over a period of time. The source' of the receipts is not
important." Using this definition it is readily apparent that the annual revenues
are sufficient to discharge the lease over a fixed period of time as well as debts
incurred by the Authority in construction.
4. The final constitutional objection to the Act is that it authorizes an
increase in indebtedness of the School District in violation of Article IX, Sections
8 and 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.9 These sections provide in effect that:
a. No school district can incur a debt of more than seven per centum of
the assessed valuation of the taxable property in the municipality and,
b. The increase of an existing indebtedness or incurring a new debt to
an amount exceeding two per centum of the-assessed value of taxable
property in the municipality without the consent of the electors of
that municipality is prohibited.
In answering this contention the court pointed out that there was no question
of an increased indebtedness for in fact there was no contemplated indebtedness.
It was declared in Appeal of the City of Erie10 that, "If the contracts and engagements of municipal corporations do not overreach their current revenues no objections can lawfully be made to them, however great the indebtedness of such
municipalities may be; for in such case their engagements do not extend beyond
their present means of payment and so no debt is incurred."
But assuming that the District is unable to pay, the lease expressly states that
in such cases the balance can be paid out of current revenues for succeeding years.
The court then categorically declared, ". .. there is no legally enfoxceable liability
for either the principal or interest attaching to the School District."
One last problem which must be considered is that created by Article III,
Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution."1 This article announces that the
1 328 Pa. 225, 195 A. 90 (1937).
S 325 Pa. 337, 190 A. 140 (1937).
9 Pennsylvania Constitution 1874, Article IX, §§ 8 mid 10.
10 91 Pa. 398 (1879).
it Pennsylvania Constitution 1874, Article 1I, § 7.
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General Assembly shall not pass any local or special law creating corporations, or
amending, renewing or extending the charters thereof. It would appear that the
Legislature did exactly what is denied it it creating the Authority. In interpreting
this section, however, our courts have declared that public corporations, such as2
the State Public School Building Authority, do not fall under the prohibition.'
This case can therefore be said to be an outstanding working example of our
legislature and judiciary attempting to solve our pressing economic and social
problems within the framework of the Constitution.
ALDERT E. ACKER
12 Set note 7, supra.

